The  outlines of the financial and credit crisis are clear though the blame will be  argued and discussed far into the future.  Three primary causes  played out over the past decade culminating in the tumultuous events of the past  two weeks with the American Federal Government on Friday putting forth a plan to  buy the housing based bad debt of the entire 
In the  early part of this decade the Federal Reserve held interest rates at  historically low levels for three years. In the mortgage industry increasingly  lax credit standards were encouraged by government pressure to lend to marginal  customers. Finally Wall Street firms became enamored of the profitability and  supposed safety of their securitized credit derivative instruments, not only  originating many products but also stocking their balance sheets with  them.  
In the  aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 the Federal Reserve cut the Fed Funds rate  in half, to 1.75%.  The rate would stay below 2.0% for almost three  years.  Those low nominal rates, negative in real inflation  adjusted terms, stoked a building and buying boom in housing that developed into  a huge speculative bubble.  
When the  Fed brought rates back to 5.25% at the end of June 2006, the bubble began to  deflate; the housing based credit crisis began a little more than a year later.  Market bubbles always burst. Perhaps the fall of the housing market now seems  preordained. But at the time the risk of the dicey mortgages spread throughout  the financial system was disguised by the financially engineered instruments  that had repackaged the questionable bits with higher quality debt, supposedly  insuring the whole against default.
Starting  in the closing years of the Clinton Administration the Community Redevelopment  Act, a Carter Era program, was used to force banks to lend to mortgage customers  formerly considered ineligible for loans. In pursuit of a social goal, universal  home ownership, banks either lowered credit standards and granted mortgages or  faced fines and business penalties for ‘redlining’.  Banks by and  large complied with government dictates.
Two of  the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) in the mortgage field, the Federal  National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage  Corporation (Freddie Mac) bought much of the bank mortgage debt and sold it back  to the market with their implied government guarantee behind it.   The banks and loan companies used the cash obtained to sponsor more loans  and keep the housing bubble inflating.  As with the banks, the GSEs  also brought some of this debt onto their balance sheets.  All in  all these two GSEs held title to or guaranteed upwards of 70% of residential  mortgages in the 
The  nozzle through which much of the air inflating the housing bubble passed was the  asset backed collateralized debt obligation (CDO) fashioned by Wall Street’s  leading investment houses and banks.  Combining different types and  grades of debt in one instrument these complex securities were supposed to  reduce risk of the whole below the level of the individual pieces.   Their complexity often rendered them opaque to the rating agencies whose  rankings customers buying the securities relied on for risk measurement. Usually  sold with default insurance these securities had one major flaw, their balance  sheet value was assessed not by the value of the underlying income streams but  by their sale price in the secondary market. If there were no market, if no one  were willing to buy these securities, the theoretical book value fell to zero.  
As the  housing market stagnated and then fell, the value of those securities with  housing components dropped as default rates on mortgages rose. But housing  prices in the 
The  
Chief  among the assumptions underpinning these derivative securities was the mark to  market rule for valuation. Imposed by regulators in the aftermath of the failure  of Enron it posits, natural enough in normal times, a functioning secondary  market. Its purpose was to insure realistic pricing for securities.   All is fine with the rule unless there is no market.  As  with the failure of Long Term Credit, it was the assumption that there will  always be a functioning orderly market that was at fault.  Markets  are not always rational, they are voluntary and they are psychological. People  and firms do not have to participate. When enough market participants choose  abstinence the market collapses and all calculations that depend on market  pricing are void. 
Markets are reflections of the faith and credit of their participants. When that is lost no amount of financial engineering can make up for the loss of liquidity. In a panic the market vanishes. The asset backed derivative made the stability of the entire financial system beholden to its least stable component, the psychology of the market.
 
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